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Abstract
Insider trading in company law is not only unethical but amounts to cheating 
by making unjust profit, and sometimes fraudulent, particularly in mergers and 
acquisitions situations. This paper aims at examining the effects of insider trading in 
mergers and acquisitions in the United Kingdom and Nigeria and how legislations 
had tried to curb the ignoble acts.  
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INTRODUCTION
The issue of insider trading in company law is a troubling one, and it is a subject 
that had attracted scholarly discussions all over the world, particularly in Europe 
and America for over forty years. Serious efforts have been made to curb the 
malaise either through market driven measures, or by legislation.  Insider trading 
has no doubt created a situation of suspicion among shareholders about the integrity 
and transparency of directors and officers of companies and other insiders, about the 
way they handle price-sensitive information of companies.
It is a world-wide view that insider trading flourishes in periods of rampant 
mergers and acquisitions, enabling insiders to use their prior knowledge to make 
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huge profits. The objective of this paper is to examine critically the effects of insider 
trading in mergers and acquisitions in the United Kingdom and Nigeria, and how 
the various legislations had tried to curb the ignoble acts.
1.  DEFINITION OF TERMS
1.1  What Is Insider Trading?
There is said to be insider trading 
when a person in possession of price sensitive information about a company buys or sells 
shares in that company, and so obtains better terms in the contract of sale than would have 
been the case, had the counterpart been aware of the information in question (Gower & 
Dayles, 2003, p.751). 
By his action, the insider can either make a profit or avoid a loss, depending on 
whether the information once made public will drive the share price up or down. 
In other words, insider trading can be said to occur where a company director or 
any other related person has the information that the company is in a bad or robust 
financial condition, buys or sells his shares in it before the piece of news is made 
public, with a view to avoiding a loss or making a higher profit.  Immediately an 
insider is in possession of confidential information not yet known to the public, he 
becomes an insider trader. 
 Insider trading is not confined to company’s shares alone, it can also occur in 
the market for government securities such as bonds and certificates. One of the 
earliest cases on insider trading or market manipulation occurred in the market for 
government bonds. In one old case,1 some fraudsters pretended themselves to be 
soldiers returning from France with the false news of the defeat of Napoleon.  The 
rumours which they spread caused the price of the British government bond to rise, 
which enabled them to dispose of their holdings at a profit.
Ordinarily, and before statutory intervention, if a director or officer of a company 
has made use for his own purpose of price-sensitive information acquired while a 
director or officer, he will have breached the fiduciary duty which he owes to the 
company and be liable to the company accordingly. The company will therefore, be 
able to recover any profit he has made even though it has suffered no loss.  In the 
American case of Diamond v. Oreamuno2 the New York Court of appeal held that 
the defendant was liable to the company for loss of reputation and integrity even if 
no financial loss was suffered.
1.2  What Is Merger and Acquisition?
Merger is the absorption of one company that ceases to exist into another that retains 
its own name and identity and acquires the assets and liabilities of the former (Black, 
1 R.V. De Berenger (1814) 3 M. 25.68.
2 (1969) 218 N.E 2d 910.
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1999). Acquisition on the other hand is the gaining possession or control over 
something.3 Section 590 of the Companies and Allied Matter Act (CAMA)4 defines 
a merger as an amalgamation of the undertaking of one or more companies and one 
or more bodies corporate,5 while a scheme of merger of companies contemplates 
a transfer of properties and liabilities of one or more companies to another, such 
transfer does not include rights and obligations which are not transferable such as 
contracts of personal service,6 and these have to be specially provided for if desired 
(Orojo, 1992, p.426).  
1.3  Who Is an Insider?
To properly appreciate the scope of insider trading and why it is considered illicit, 
it is essential to profile the typical insider trader, how he operates in the security 
market, and the consequences of his seemingly harmless act.
The typical insider trader falls within 2 broad categories:
Section 57 (2) (a) of the Criminal Justice Act, 1993 of Great Britain established 
two categories of insider. The first are those who obtain inside information through 
being a director, employee or an issuer of securities, while the second category is the 
individual with inside information though having access to the information by virtue 
of his employment, office or profession whether or not in the employment of the 
issue.  Insider in this category may include a professional adviser to the company i.e 
lawyer, accountant etc., and their employees, an investment analyst, a civil or public 
servant.
1.4  The Securities Market
The securities market, where the insider trader operates, is a specialized trading 
place where financial instruments like stocks, bonds, treasury bills etc. are bought 
and sold. It is very important to note that, unlike in commodities market where 
purchases are premise on physical inspection, assessment, and comparison of goods, 
the investment decision to buy or sell an instrument being traded in the securities 
market is solely based on information about the issuer and the instrument itself 
(Ndanusa, 2001, October). To be useful to investors, such information must be 
correct, complete and up to date. 
An investment decision that is premised upon wrong or misleading information 
would, inevitably, result in loss of money to the investor. It stands to reason 
therefore, that it is the fellow who has (or claims to have) accurate information 
about a particular company that will be in vantage position to profitably trade in 
3  Id.
4  Chapter   C20 LFN 2004 of  Nigeria.
5  Mergers and Acquisition hitherto discussed under SS 590, 593 of CAMA 1990 have been repealed 
and transferred to part XI, SS. 99,  of the Investment and Securities Act, Chapter I24 LFN 2004.
6 Re Bendel Line co. Ltd (1979) FHCR 19.
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that company’s securities. Thus, securities traders/ investors strive to get the inside 
information about a company before making a decision to trade in that company’s 
securities.  More often than not, they scheme to cultivate the directors, officers, 
employees, or in some cases, influential members of the company who can give 
them such ‘inside’ information. Realizing the financial implications of corporate 
information which they held, these insiders soon began a personal practice of 
trading in the company’s securities, with a view to making personal gains, and in 
breach of their fiduciary obligation not to make personal profits from their use of 
corporate assets.7
The security market, itself, is a highly regulated environment.  The securities 
market is viewed by most Governments as an effective agency for channeling 
funds into productive enterprises, which would drive economic development 
and help reduce unemployment. Thus, any act which tends to undermine the 
integrity of the market (otherwise called market abuses) are usually frowned at, 
and outlawed for the simple reason that such individual practices are capable of 
eroding the larger investing public’s confidence in the market which is critical to 
the continuous flow of funds for overall national development.8 Such acts include 
concealment of material information, insider trading, market manipulation, 
artificial price fixing etc.. From the above, one could premise the legal prohibition 
on insider trading on combination of moral fiduciary, as well as on public policy 
grounds.
2.  EFFECTS OF INSIDER TRADING
The implications on rampant insider trading are that anyone buying or selling 
shares in the market runs a risk of doing so just before some good or bad news 
is announced about the company. Sometimes the news will benefit the trader 
and sometimes not, and it will depend on whether the trader has bought or sold. 
Conversely, and in the absence of insider dealing, the trader can expect that these 
pieces of good or bad fortune will average out. In an environment where insider 
dealing is rife in the market, the non-insider will know that the market prices will 
7  See the case of United States v O’ Hagan,  521 U.S 642, 655 (1997) where U.S Su-
preme Court  specif ical ly recognized that  a  corporation’s information is  i ts  proper-
ty: “A company’s confidential information… qualifies as property to which the compa-
ny has a right of exclusive use.  The undisclosed misappropriation of such information in 
violation of a fiduciary duty… constitutes fraud akin to embezzlement – the fraudulent ap-
propriation to one’s own use of the money or goods entrusted to one’s care by another.”
8 The nexus between maintaining good corporate practices, ensuring a healthy and fair 
securities market and economic prosperity will be better appreciated with U.S experience. 
The U.S stock market crash of 1929, which led to the Great Economic Depression of the 
1930’s, was widely attributed to the activities of corporate insiders.  The U.S Senate hearings 
which ensures unearthed flagrant abuses of inside information by several people in fiduciary 
positions.  See U.S Senate Committee Report No. 1455. 73rd congress, 2nd session, 55 (1934).
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systematically fall to reflect the true worth of the company and will do so in a way 
which is unfavorable to the outsiders.
Where regulation is unavailable, there will be an inherent risk in holding shares 
in companies, which will affect the perception of investors in taking decisions on 
the prices they are prepared to pay for the company’s shares.  The situation will, in 
turn increase companies cost of capital as they will be able to issue shares on less 
favourable terms than if investors can be assured that insider trading is non-existent 
in the market.
Furthermore, the use of insider information by the insider is no doubt unfair to 
those who deal with the insider and the shareholder.  It is cheating and dishonesty, 
since the insider possesses a secret advantage from which he will benefit at the 
expense of others. The insider may be a top employee or manager or executive or 
information officer in the company, as to be in a position to dictate or influence 
when the public disclosure of price-sensitive information is to be made.  In that 
situation, he allows his personal interest and greed to have priority over that of 
the company. Such unethical conduct brings down not only the reputation of the 
company concerned but also the security market into disrepute and may shake 
public confidence in investment shares (Ola, 2002, p.357).
3.  CONTROL OF INSIDER TRADING
Given the recognition that it is wrong for a director or any insider to deal in a 
company’s shares having been seized of some development which will affect the 
price of the shares, and which other members or the general public are not privy, 
the pertinent question is how to put an end to such ignoble practice.  The global 
condemnation of the malpractice has produced different solutions for its eradication 
which are as follows.
3.1  The Doctrine of Mandatory Disclosure
In the United Kingdom, a number of approaches to regulate insider trading have 
been taken.  For example the doctrine of mandatory disclosure has long been used 
to control insider trading.  Directors and their family members as potential insiders 
may be required to disclose dealings in their company’s shares on the theory that if 
they know that the fact of their dealings will be made public knowledge, they will be 
less likely to trade on the basis of inside information.  The doctrine of disclosure is 
the oldest anti-insider trading technique that was introduced on the recommendation 
of the Cohen Committee of 1945,9 which identified insider dealing as the rationale 
for requiring the disclosure. The committee recommended that “the best safeguard 
against improper transactions by directors and against unfounded suspicion of such 
9 Report of the Committee on Company Amendment (MD 6659, 1945).
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transaction is to ensure that disclosure is made of all their transaction in the shares 
or debentures of their companies”.10
3.2  Prohibiting Trading in Shares by Potential Insiders
Another approach is prohibiting trading in shares by potential insiders, irrespective 
of whether they are in possession of inside information or not.  This was also 
introduced in 1967 on the recommendation of the Jenkins Committee and the 
recommendation had been replicated in Section 323 of the 1985 Companies Act, 
and which also creates a criminal offence. Similarly, the Company Securities 
(Insider Dealing) Act 1985 prohibits an individual connected with a company from 
trading or dealing on a recognized stock exchange, or through a dealer in securities 
of that company, if he is in possession of unpublished price-sensitive information 
concerning the company. He is also subject to penalty if he procures someone also 
to deal on his behalf and must not communicate the price-sensitive information to 
any person.
There is also the FSA (Financial Services Act), 2012. The Act sets out strict 
ground rules for dealing in shares of public companies. The relevant regulatory 
body is the Financial Services Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority(FCA) 
is established as the appropriate regulator. That Act also amends the ruling UK 
statutory arrangements – i.e. the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. A Code 
of Market Conduct now exists under the auspices of the FCA.
 The Act require, the board of listed companies to adopt a code and to 
take all proper and reasonable steps to secure compliance with it, not only by 
directors of the companies but also by the directors of subsidiaries, as well as 
the companies employees and its subsidiaries who are likely by reason of their 
office or employment to be in possession of price-sensitive information relating 
to the companies. Under the Act it is emphasized that directors should not deal 
in shares during the “closed period” which broadly means the two months period 
preceding the preliminary announcement of the company’s annual results or of 
the announcement of the half yearly results. Even outside the closed periods, the 
Act requires a director who wishes to trade in shares to give notice to the board 
chairman or a committee of directors appointed specifically for that purpose and to 
receive clearance in advance.  The Act provides that clearance must not be given for 
dealing in any closed period. It also prohibits dealing at any other time if there is in 
existence unpublished information which is likely to have an effect on the quoted 
price of the shares.Directors who flout the terms of the Act can be excluded from 
serving as directors of listed companies for a long time.  
In Nigeria, there are similar Codes known as the “Dealing Rules”. The Dealing 
Rules is operated by the Nigerian Stock Exchange. Similarly the Securities and 
10 Ibid at p.6; see also section 324 of  the English company’s Act 1985.
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Exchange Commission (SEC) has its Rules made pursuant to the Investments and 
Securities Act ( ISA). Regrettably, the Dealing Rules is not effectively operated to 
detect and control insider trading, given the Nigerian factor, where nobody would 
come out to give information.  Enquiries at both the Stock Exchange and SEC met 
the usual excuse that there has been no confirmed report of insider trading, and that 
if there was any report, it would be investigated and dealt with. The SEC admitted 
the rumour of insider dealing in a recent case of shares transfer involving African 
Petroleum Plc and that the rumour was “thoroughly” investigated and found to 
be untrue.  Their attention was also drawn to the rumoured leak of price-sensitive 
information on the shares of Nigerian Breweries Plc shortly before its year 2004 
annual results were published, and the attendant massive purchase of the shares 
by insiders. As usual they admitted knowledge of the rumour, but the subsequent 
investigation did not conclusively prove any wrong doing.
The only instrument used by the Stock Exchange to prevent insider trading under 
its Dealing Rules is that of “technical suspension”. Trading in the shares of any listed 
company, that is either doing rights issues or offer for public subscription is technically 
suspended until the allotment results are published and the new shares listed. Under 
the Dealing Rules, trading in the shares of companies facing acquisition and merger is 
also suspended during the processes until it is concluded or abandoned.  Recently the 
trading in the shares of Guarantee Trust Bank Plc was technically suspended, when it 
made an acquisition bid for Inland Bank. SEC also has powers under Section 27 of the 
I.S.A to suspend the trading in the shares of any listed company in the public interest. 
There is always cooperation between the Stock Exchange and SEC in the use of the 
power of technical suspension, because the power of SEC to suspend trading in shares 
has statutory backing under Section 27 ISA.
There is no doubt that insider trading is rampant in Nigeria and its effect has 
started to show on the confidence of the public in Nigeria’s stock market. 
3.3  The Common Law Approach
A third approach is to rely on the common law principles to deal with insider 
trading. Ordinarily at common law, directors and officers of a company had always 
been freely permitted to hold and deal in the shares of their company. The only 
sanction which the common law imposed was to make actionable the use of certain 
confidential information belonging to the company. 
However, if directors make use of information acquired as director for their 
personal advantage they would have breached their fiduciary duties to the company 
and be liable to account to it for any profits they had made, whether or not the 
company suffered loss. The duty is not owed to the directors or shareholders but 
to the company. In the case of Percival v. Wright.11 The directors had purchased a 
11 (1902) 2 Ch 421.
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member’s shares in the knowledge that there was a ready buyer for all the shares 
of the company at a higher price than the directors were to be paid. It was held that 
the transaction could not be set aside for the directors’ failure to disclose the on-
going negotiation for the sale of the shares of the company at higher price. It was 
said that there was no duty to disclose, because there was no fiduciary relationship 
between the directors and individual shareholders.  The director’s duty was owed 
to the company alone. Contrast with the case of Allen v. Hyatt.12 The directors had 
profited through shares purchases from members and were held accountable to them 
because they had purposes to act as agents for the members by inducing the latter 
to give them purchase options over each member’s shares supposedly to facilitate a 
proposed amalgamation. The distinction is that the court established some special 
relationship which established a legal duty to disclose all relevant information, 
because directors have placed themselves in the position as agents, negotiating on 
behalf of the individual shareholders.
4.  CRIMINALISING INSIDER TRADING
Given the global recognition that insider trading in company law is unethical, 
amounts to cheating by making unjust profit, and sometimes fraudulent, particularly 
in merger and acquisition situations, the current trend globally is to criminalize 
insider trading and certain associated acts. Criminal sanctions form the basis of the 
anti-insider legislation in many parts of the world.
5.  CRIMINALIZING INSIDER TRADING IN GREAT 
BRITAIN
In Great Britain for example, the original general legislation on insider trading was 
contained in Part V of the Companies Act 1980 which was latter consolidated in the 
Company’s Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985. However, the current Principal 
Act on insider dealing can be found in Pt. V of the Criminal Justice Act, 1993.
5.1  Criminal Justice Act, 1993
The Act13 defines the main offence it creates when it provides that:
●  “An individual who has information as an insider is guilty of insider dealing 
if, in the circumstances mentioned in subsection (3), he deals in securities 
that are price-affected securities in relation to the information”.  
●  An individual who has information as an insider is also guilty of insider 
dealing if –
12  (1914) 30 T 4 R 44.
13 S. 52 (1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1993 of Great Britain. 
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●  He encourages another person to deal in securities that are (whether or not 
that others knows it) price-affected securities in relation to the information, 
knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the dealing would take 
place in the circumstances mentioned in subsection (3); or
●  He discloses the information, otherwise than in the proper performance of 
the functions of his employment, office of profession, to another person.
●  The circumstances referred to above are that the acquisition or disposal in 
question occurs on a regulated market, or that the person dealing relies on a 
professional intermediary or is himself acting as a professional intermediary.
Section 56 defines insider information as information which:
 Relates to particular securities or to a particular issuer or securities and not 
to securities generally or to issues of securities generally;
●  Is specific or precise;
●  Has not been made public;
●  If it were made public would be likely to have a significant effect on the 
price of any securities.
The definition of inside information clearly includes information also from 
outside the company, for example where a proposed government liberalization 
policy concern a particular sector, as well as, information emanating from within, 
like say, the company was about to declare a substantial dividend and bonus issue, 
like it happened with the Nigerian Breweries Plc. in 2004, or there is a imminent 
takeover or amalgamation with a multinational company, which could have 
significant effect on the value of the shares of the company.
5.2  Prohibited Act
The Act14 prohibited the insider from four acts.  The first is that there must be no 
dealing in the relevant securities, i.e those “price-affected” and those which the 
price will be significantly affected if the inside information is made public.  Sections 
55 also define dealing as acquiring or disposing of securities.
Secondly, the insider is prohibited from procuring directly or indirectly, the 
acquisition or disposal of securities by any other person. There will be procurement 
within the Act, if the acquisition is done by the insider’s agent or nominee or a 
person acting at his or her own direction.
The third prohibition is on the individual encouraging another person to deal with 
price-affected securities, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that dealing 
would take place on a regulated market or through a professional intermediary. The 
last prohibition, under Section 52 (2) (b) is that the individual must not disclose the 
information, except in the ordinary performance of his duties, as an employee, office 
or professional to another person e.g Stockbroker.
14 In Section 52.
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5.3  Criminal Sanction
The criminal sanctions imposed under Section 61 of the Act are, generally on 
summary conviction, a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum and /or terms 
of imprisonment not exceeding six months or to both, and on conviction or 
indictment an unlimited fine and / or imprisonment for not more than seven years. 
The power given to the judge to impose an unlimited fine presupposes that the 
intention of the law is to ensure that the insider does not make any profit out of 
the dealing.
In addition to the criminal penalties, the English courts have used the 
disqualification sanction under Section 2 of the Company Directors Disqualification 
Act 1986, which enables a court to disqualify a person who has been convicted of 
an indictable offence in connection with the management of a company, against 
some insiders.  Thus in R. V. Goodman15 the Managing Director had disposed of 
his shares in the company in advance of the publication of bad news about the 
prospects of the company. The Court of Appeal upheld the Crown Courts decision to 
disqualify for a period of 10 years, the managing director was convicted of insider 
dealing.
6.  CRIMINALISING INSIDER TRADING IN NIGERIA  
In Nigeria, two principal legislation addressed the issue of insider trading in merger 
and acquisition; and they are the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) 
and the Investment and Securities Act (ISA). It is appropriate to first examine the 
provisions of CAMA , being the enabling provision in the operation of companies in 
Nigeria.
6.1  Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA), Chapter C20 LFN, 
2004 
Sections 614 to 624 CAMA which falls under part XVII that deals with and 
criminalized insider trading in Nigeria had been repealed by S.263 (1) of ISA. 
This part has now been transferred to the Investment and Securities Act for two 
reasons:
●  The Investment and Securities Act came later in time and was more recent 
than the Companies and Allied Matters Act. The ISA was dated 1999 and 
2007 subsequently while CAMA was dated 1990. The provisions of CAMA 
and ISA are also almost the same all through on the topic which therefore 
amounts to mere repetition.
●  The ISA is also a specific legislation on topics like mergers and acquisitions 
and securities unlike CAMA.
15 (1993) 2 All E.R. ‘89CA.
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6.2  Investment and Securities Act (ISA), 2007
Another prominent law that war against insider trading in mergers & acquisitions is 
the Investment and Securities Act. The ISA 2007 was an improvement on the 1999 
Act on issues of mergers, acquisitions and securities with slight differences from the 
1999 Act. The relevant sections will now be discussed.
The relevant provisions of the Act in this respect shall now be discussed.  Section 
111 of the Act defines an insider as a person who is, or at any time in the preceding 
six months has been knowingly connected to the company. He may be a director, 
officer or member of that company or a related company, which position gives him 
access to unpublished price sensitive information about the company and which it 
would be reasonable to expect a person in his position not to disclose, except for the 
proper performance of his duty.
6.3  What Acts Are Forbidden to an Insider?
The Act16 forbids an insider from dealing in the securities of a company if he has 
information which he knows are unpublished price sensitive information in 
relation to those securities. The Acts17 forbids any individual from receiving and 
using such unpublished price sensitive information from an insider, with the proviso 
that insider must have been connected with the company at any time within the six 
months preceding the reception of the information by the outsider. This section also 
forbids the individual who obtains such information from the insider from using it 
to deal in the securities of another company in so far as the information relates to 
any transaction between the first company and the latter company.
The Act18 precludes an individual who is involved, or has been involved in a take-
over bid for a company, from using any unpublished price sensitive information 
which he has obtained thereby to trade in the company’s securities.  He is also 
precluded from passing this information to another person to use in trading in the 
company’s securities. The provisions of the Act19 operates to forbid a public officer, 
or former public officer, (i.e the Director General of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission or Nigerian Stock Exchange) who by virtue of his position comes into 
possession of unpublished price sensitive information in relation to the securities 
of a particular company from dealing in that security or, procure any other person 
to deal in that security or communicate this information to any person whom he 
reasonably has caused to believe will utilize such information for trading in that 
company’s securities.  Interestingly, subsection (4) of this section empowers the 
Minister of Finance to declare any person connected with a body which exercises 
public function, and who gains access thereby to such information as public officers.
16 S. 111, I.S.A.
17 Id.
18  Id
19 S. 112,  I.S.A.
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The Act20 however excuses an individual from using such information if such use 
was not for making profit or the avoidance of loss, either for himself or for another 
person or, if the person is a receiver, liquidator or trustee in bankruptcy, for entering 
into a transaction in the course of his duties.  It also excuses stockbrokers and other 
professional financial advices from using the information in the performance of 
their duties. The Act21 also absolves the trustee or personal representative of liability 
in using such information provided that such trustee acted on the advice of a person 
who is not prohibited by the Act.22 
Section 114 of the Act provides that any transaction done in contravention 
of section 111 or 112 of this Act is avoidable at the instance of the Commission. 
Section 115 of the Act also provides that any person who contravenes any of the 
provisions of this part of this Act commits an offence and is liable on conviction in 
the case of a person not being a body corporate, to a fine of not less than N500,000 
or an amount equivalent to double the amount of profit derived by him or loss 
averted by the use of the information obtained in contravention of any of the 
provisions of this part; or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years; or 
in the case of a person being a body corporate, to a fine not less than N1,000,000 or 
an amount equivalent to twice the amount of profit derived by it or loss averted by 
the use of the information obtained in contravention of any of the provisions of this 
part.
Section 116 (1) provides for criminal liability and states that a person who 
is liable under this part of this Act shall pay compensation at the order of the 
Commission or the Tribunal, as the case may be, to any aggrieved person who, in a 
transaction for the purchase or sale of securities entered into with the first-mentioned 
person or with a person acting for or on his behalf, suffers a loss by reason of the 
difference between the price at which the securities would have likely been dealt in 
such a transaction at the time when the first-mentioned transaction took place if the 
contravention had not occurred.
Subsection (2) provides that the amount of compensation for which a person is 
liable under subsection (1) of this section is the amount of the loss sustained by the 
person claiming the compensation or any other amount as may be determined by the 
Commission or the Tribunal.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
There is no doubt that the unethical practice of insider trading in company law, 
particularly during merger and acquisition is a world-wide phenomenon.  There 
20S. 113,  I.S.A  
21 S. Id.
22 S. Id
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is also global effort to stamp it out. The various efforts at eradicating it, which 
started under self regulatory market codes, and the common law doctrine of 
disclosure have developed to the state where many countries including Nigeria 
have criminalized the practice in its various ramifications.  Insider traders will not 
only pay fines, disgorge their unjust profits, they will also go to jail. It is generally 
true that the United States and Britain had been at the forefront of the attack 
on insider trading by putting in place appropriate legislation and machineries 
for detecting, investigating and prosecuting offenders.  Their machineries had 
worked effectively and prominent people who ran foul of the law had been dealt 
with.  In the United States, the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) is the 
arrowhead of the fight against insider trading. They bring at least sixty cases to 
court every year and the Commission has very closely been monitoring activities 
in the market to be able to pursue cases against insiders. Unlike the Nigerian SEC 
which is static, perceived and unresponsive. Their fight against insider trading 
is at best pedestrian. The summation is that in spite of the existence of the self-
regulating dealing rules of the Stock Exchange and the criminalization of the 
practice sunder two laws, not much has been done to address the issue in Nigeria. 
The general explanation of the authorities is that the incidence of insider trading is 
not rampant. The directors and employees of companies in Nigeria are not ready 
to blow the whistle on insider traders among themselves.  Who will guard the 
guards?
Despite the global efforts at curbing insider trading, can one say it has abated? I 
think time will tell.  But one thing is certain, in spite of the legal implications and 
the threat of heavy fines and or long term imprisonment, the temptation and lure 
to make huge profits will probably still be too much for professional insiders to 
resist, and the enforcement agencies will continue to have much work to do. The 
recommendations below will however be helpful.
For SEC to live up to its statutory responsibility of protecting the security 
market from insider trading, it is recommended that the following steps be urgently 
taken:
(a) SEC should reorganize its priorities, and reshape its focus as the apex 
securitiesmarket enforcer if the fight against insider trading is to be taken seriously 
in Nigeria. Reference could be made to the situation in the United States (U.S.) 
where investigating and prosecuting insider traders had remained an enforcement 
priority for U.S SEC for more than 70 years. Recent statistics show that in the 9 
year period between 2001 to 2009, it filed charges against over 600 individuals and 
entities for insider trading violations, and froze millions of dollars illicit trading 
proceeds.
(b) Apart from monitoring individual compliance, SEC’s work should extend to 
monitoring the entities that should shoulder primary responsibility for supervising 
professionals that work for them. i.e SEC should monitor the efficacy of internal 
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anti-insider trading rules that exist in companies. For instance, in 2006, the U.S SEC 
instituted administrative proceedings against Morgan Stanley Inc. For its failure to 
maintain and enforce adequate written policies and procedures to prevent the misuse 
of material non-public information by the firms or persons associated with them. 
Although, there was no evidence that material non-public was misused as a result 
of that failure, the company agreed to pay $10 million in civil penalties, as well as 
engage an independent consultant to conduct a review of its policies, practices and 
procedure and to recommend changes to those policies to prevent the future abuse 
of such non-public information.23
(c) SEC should make regulations mandating Directors, Officers, and those 
categories of staff that have access, ordinarily, to unpublished price sensitive 
information to disclose their shareholdings in the company every 6 months. The 
level of these holdings should be kept under close scrutiny, especially in the few 
weeks before the Annual General Meeting of the company when inside trading 
reaches its feverish pitch. It will be quite easy to fish out perpetrators within this 
period.
(d) SEC should eliminate the information asymmetry between the insider and 
the investing public. For instance, the accounts and results of quoted companies are 
usually released to stockbrokers before the general public. It is submitted that this 
practice may encourage insider trading from the employees of the stock brokers. 
(Idigbe, 2006, p.70) 
(e) Brokers/ Dealer firms should pay particular attention to particular orders from 
clients in companies, where such clients are Directors, Officer and employees, or are 
retainers of such companies. Furthermore, the management of such Broking firms is 
expected to diligently guard all material information about companies which may be 
in their possession, as to prevent insiders dealings in the securities of such company 
by their own staff.
(f) Under the ISA, the sanction for the offence of insider trading is either civil, 
criminal or both. As most allegations of insider dealings are based largely on indirect 
or circumstantial evidence, the law enforcement system needs to concentrate more 
on civil penalties in order to enforce the laudable provisions of the ISA. This would, 
obviously, also help in eliminating the problem that would present by establishing 
the criminal burden of proof. (Abugu, 2005, p.258)
(g) There is also the pressing need for a closer collaboration between SEC and 
the Attorney General’s office as regards the successful enforcement and prosecution 
of insider trader. As the law stands now, criminal prosecution is the constitutional 
responsibility of the Attorney General’s office. Where the goals of the two bodies 
23 See Testimony Concerning Insider Trading by Linda Chatman Thomsen (Director of Enforcement, 
U.S SEC)  Before the U.S Senate Committee on Judiciary.  Retrieved  2006, September  26 from http:// 
www.sec.gov/news/testimony
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diverge, problems arise.  As the Attorney General is responsible for the enforcement 
of all federal laws, not just securities law, enforcement problems will linger if the 
Attorney General has other pressing priorities other than the prosecution of insider 
trading.
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